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Do social relationships between people give rise to any demands of 
social justice whatsoever?  If they do, are they of any practical significance 
given the relationships living human beings are actually in?  And, might 
they be so significant as to ground a theory of global justice—if not the 
whole of anything rightly called justice, then at least of the central range 
of issues in world politics?  Finally, could that perhaps be what a political
philosophy of global justice should mainly be about? 
Here, in bare outline, is how the answers to all of these questions might 
be “yes,” at least for questions of socioeconomic distributive justice. 
I. PRACTICE-BASED OBLIGATIONS 
A social practice, or system of several social practices, can be said to 
generate moral obligations of “what we owe to each other,” in T. M. 
*  © 2015 Aaron James. Professor of Philosophy, UC Irvine. 
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Scanlon’s sense.1  Reasoning about what we owe to others, about what 
people can or cannot reasonably complain of, is already highly sensitive 
to a specific context of interaction, though even in a state of nature, with
no practices established. When a social practice is on hand, we can also
justify principles of justice for, and in part from, its distinctive structure,
in light of the best—perhaps “constructive”—interpretation of its understood 
aims and organization.2  In such a practice-based justification, principles are
defended not simply by pure sociological interpretation, and not simply
by pure moral argument, but rather by both, blended together in a suitable 
reflective equilibrium.3 
So in response to the first of the questions I posed at the outset, we can 
answer that at least some social relationships can indeed generate 
obligations of their own. When people, or collective agents, have organized 
their conduct according to social expectations for the sake of some generally
understood purpose, at least some principles will specify what those involved 
owe each other, in view of their common association, its consequences, and 
its presumed aims.4  In the first instance, such principles are addressed to the 
organized group as collective obligations.  However, particular parties can
then be said to acquire obligations by association to uphold the principles 
as they can, aside from any natural duties they may have, which may apply 
as well.
Such associative principles and obligations, justified specifically for a 
type of practice, will not necessarily have independent application. When a
legal system is established for various purposes—for example, for the
mutual assurances needed for security—its subjects surely have moral
rights of due process.  But they can have those rights within the system 
because of the risks of arbitrary arrest or indefinite detention that come 
along with a working system of rule.  The protections they can reasonably 
demand, given the risks they actually face under a prevailing system, will
not necessarily be called for when those risks are not in fact being created. 
Therefore, principles of due process justified on the basis of risks being 
1. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 4 (1998) (“[T]he subject 
matter of judgments of right and wrong . . . are judgments about what would be permitted 
by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find 
principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not 
reasonably reject.”). 
2. AARON JAMES, FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 26, 29 (2012) [hereinafter FAIRNESS].
 3. See Aaron James, Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the 
Status Quo, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 281, 301, 305 (2005); FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 25–30; 
Aaron James, Why Practices?, 51 RAISONS POLITIQUES 43, 45 (2013) [hereinafter Practices];
Aaron James, Reply to Critics, 44 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 286, 288–90 (2014) [hereinafter
Reply].
 4. See Practices, supra note 3, at 44.
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created will not necessarily apply otherwise, under relevantly different
circumstances, whether in a state of nature or under a sufficiently different
legal order. 
Once justified, a practice-sensitive principle has a conditional form— 
“given a legal system, with such-and-such risks, etc., such-and-such is
required”. Because conditionally true, a principle can trivially count as 
true or correct whether or not the practice in question exists.5  But it can
remain practice-sensitive in important respects.  Its antecedent will still 
make essential reference to relevant social facts and circumstances; a 
principle that did not would not necessarily be the same principle and 
would need to be separately justified.  Even a conditionally true principle,
justified for a kind of social practice, will not apply unless the relevant 
social practice exists. If the relevant practice is not actually established, 
the principle will not apply in the actual world, to us.  And it will not then 
be normative for us, in the sense of actually giving us certain reasons for
action.6 
Both practice-independent and practice-dependent principles call for 
the same policies and institutions.  This would not imply that practice-
based principles are insufficient; all that follows is that the policies are 
normatively overdetermined by what may be separate sufficient grounds 
of perhaps fundamentally different kinds.  The practice theorist can claim 
to be the only game in town, but need not do so.  The essential claim is
one of sufficiency, which might be put as follows: even if we assume,
arguendo, that there are no natural, practice-independent principles, rights, 
or duties, it is nevertheless true that at least some social practices suffice 
to generate at least some moral principles for their regulation. 
II. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE PRACTICE OF TRADE 
To the second question posed earlier, about whether such associational 
demands are at all significant for policy, my own practice-based answer 
is that they apply with consequence not only to the state, but also to
5.  Such principles are trivially “fact-insensitive,” in the terms used by G. A. Cohen.
G. A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 233–34 (2008).  For any hypothesized 
social reality F, and any principles that apply P, it will be true that “If F, then P,” whatever 
the actual world facts.  Such conditionalized principles are also “fact-sensitive” in the
sense that their applicability and normativity depends on the existence of P, as noted in the 
text. Id. at 233. Nor, pace Cohen, are such trivial principles in any interesting sense 
“fundamental.” 
6.  I elaborate upon this later in this Article.  See infra Part VII. 
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international relations.  They create obligations for societies that participate
in international social practices and, secondarily, create obligations for
between individuals in different societies by virtue of being related by
their societies’ relations.  They do so in at least two major ways. 
First, as I have argued elsewhere, societal obligations of fairness arise 
within the global economy.7  The global economy as we know it is enabled 
and shaped by an emergent social practice of trade, in which different
societies mutually rely upon common markets, for the sake of the national 
income gains due to specialization to comparative advantage, economies 
of scale, and the spread of technology. The international practice of market 
reliance in turn gives rise to principled demands of structural equity,
which concern how the national income gains are shared among different 
trading countries and their respective social classes.8 By default, gains 
over background societal endowments are to be shared equally among
trading societies, unless greater gains flow to poorer countries.9  “Losers” 
within countries are to be compensated by social insurance schemes—and
among a society’s fair share of gains, gains for different social groups are 
to be distributed equally, unless inequality is otherwise acceptable.10 
I claim that these principles are significant for certain policy choices— 
tariff levels, social insurances schemes, industrial policy, and international 
rules concerned with export subsidies, infant industries, and policy
discrimination.  They are also limited in important ways. Because they
are assumed to apply only to the surplus of specifically international
cooperation, they do not support—and also do not preclude—claims to
resources or output not due to trade—under autarky, which may differ 
considerably from country to country and underwrite very different standards
of living. 
At the same time, the relation between productivity due to trade and
background endowments is not fixed over time.11  In any trade practice,
each country will refine its national division of labor by focusing on what
it does best relative to its productive options—or by arbitrarily dividing 
specializations—with a consequent increase in national productive capacity, 
while at the same time enabling a similar specialization and increase in
national productive capability in the other trading countries.12  As reliance
on the practice steadily continues, each of the countries does better in
 7. FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 8, 131. 
8. Id. at 3, 165. 
9. Id. at 165–66. 
10.  For a full statement of these principles, see FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 203–45. 
11. Id. at 181. 
12. Stephen Redding, Dynamic Comparative Advantage and the Welfare Effects of
Trade, 51 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 15, 22 (1995). 
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national income than it could and would give no or lesser trade. Whether 
or for how long there is a relevant difference between the gains of trade 
and background endowments depends on how deeply and quickly these 
become integrated, especially given dynamic trade to comparative advantage, 
which seeks to cultivate more productive industry for its higher returns.13 
As South Korea and other development success stories suggest, this may
quickly improve a country’s position in the international division of labor, 
even from a poorly endowed start.14 
So much is generally assumed by much of international economics, both
in abstract models and as a rough characterization of existing economic 
relations.  My claim is that this familiar picture suffices as a relatively
uncontroversial basis for a limited but practically significant egalitarian
requirement of fairness that is foreign in much of economic thought. 
National income gains are created by specifically international cooperation 
and so raises questions of egalitarian distribution among the countries that
jointly create them.15  At the same time, the result is limited to the gains
from trade over and above background endowments, suitably adjusted for 
dynamic improvements over time.  So the question remains, what shall 
we say about the general wealth of nations, beyond its mere augmentation
through trade? 
III. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE TERRITORIAL STATE SYSTEM 
This brings us to a second source of societal obligation.  The state system, 
of which trade practice is an embedded sub-system, generates its own 
associational responsibilities, which partly concern the way the system 
itself shapes even background societal endowments.16 
The state system is a social practice.  In the modern age, beginning with 
the Treaties of Westphalia, the world has settled upon a political practice 
in which authority is divided over distinct territorial jurisdictions, with
default rights of non-interference from outside, all for the sake of certain
 13. Id. at 15, 22. 
14. See generally Aaron James, Fortune and Fairness in Global Economic Life 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of California, Irvine) (discussing an
alternative to the traditional laissez-faire system of trade). 
15. AARON JAMES, Authority and Territory: A Practice Account, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
NEW EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (Claire Finklestein & Sharon Lloyd, eds., Oxford Univ. Press) 
(forthcoming). 
16. Practices, supra note 3, at 57. 
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social purposes, especially peace, or at least the reduction of violence.17 
Whatever other issues of justice this social reality raises, societies can be 
said to owe things to one another, simply by virtue of their decentralized
political union.18  The members of a society will often be in a position to 
reasonably complain of how their society is treated under the common
practice, especially in view of the societal goods the system itself promises to
deliver, by virtue of taking them as one of its aims.  Principles of what 
societies owe to each other within their common practice can thus apply, 
and particular societies can come to be obligated by association to set the 
system right. 
To elaborate, whatever realist doubts one may have about whether 
states follow rules in their dealings with one another—if only by invoking 
them as a public basis for criticism, sanction, and occasional punishment—
the territorial state system itself is the constitutive backdrop against which 
international rules and all state choices function.19  Three kinds of constitutive
social norms are particularly central. First, each of many distinct but 
functionally similar political states is granted jurisdictional rights—a set
of Hohfeldian powers to regulate its borders, set rules for the use of its 
resources, govern supremely over its population, and so on—over a specified 
territory.20  These are often called norms of territorial “supremacy.”21 
Second, each such authority is permitted to repel outside attackers, but is 
also subject to default expectations of non-interference across territorial 
jurisdictions, which may be qualified by secondary norms that permit 
17. AUTHORITY AND TERRITORY, supra note 15, at 5. See also John Gerard Ruggie, 
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L 
ORG. 139, 163–64 (1993). 
18. Practices, supra note 3, at 57. 
19.  Similarly, for realists such as Kenneth Waltz, powerful state incentives of self-
help are seen as created by the state system’s effective operation.  KENNETH WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 72, 91 (1979).  I resist Waltz’s view on practice-
based grounds in FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 82–87. 
20. “[T]he distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has 
differentiated its subject [i.e., the organization of human collectivities] collectively into 
territorially defined, fixed . . . mutually exclusive [functionally similar, political centralized] 
enclaves of legitimate [and supreme] dominion. As such, it appears to be unique in human
history,” especially in contrast with the territorially fluid medieval order, and anything yet
to emerge in its place.  Ruggie, supra note 17, at 151. 
21. It is worth emphasizing that territorial rights are not strictly speaking property
rights, but rather powers to set property rights. For a discussion of this issue, see Anna 
Stilz, Why Do States Have Territorial Rights, 1 INT’L THEORY 185, 189–90 (2009) and
Anna Stilz, Nations, States, and Territory, 121 ETHICS 121 (2011).  Lockeans such as A. 
John Simmons attempt to explain state territorial rights in terms of natural property rights,
but also admit that this is a revisionistic project. See A. John Simmons, On the Territorial 
Rights of States, 35 NOÛS 300, 318–20 (Supp. s1 Oct. 2001). 
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intervention, under specified conditions.22  This is often called the “norm
of non-intervention.”23  Third, further rules or understandings specify 
what types of functionally similar states could qualify for membership in 
the system, as bearers of its rights and subjects of its obligations.  Such
membership criteria may evolve, shaped by international standards within 
a secondary practice for recognizing a political group as a member by
other member states.24 
In fact, every existing society and every government has been deeply
shaped by this territorial division of political authority, even as domestic 
developments such as the rise of democracy have also shaped it from 
below in a process of co-evolution.25  Being a state at all, properly speaking 
arguably depends on this larger association.  As Hedley Bull suggests, a 
domestic state is to be contrasted with an “independent political community 
which merely claims a right to sovereignty (or is judged by others to have 
such a right), but cannot assert this right in practice.”26 This, Bull suggests, 
“is not a state properly so-called.”27 
22. Even “sovereignty” as a default legal standing hardly means that states are equal 
in capability or functioning in real practice.  We can agree with Krasner that conventional 
models of legal sovereignty are unrealistic. See generally STEPHEND. KRASNER,SOVEREIGNTY: 
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). We can also agree with David A. Lake that power relations 
are often shaped not simply by coercion but by special authority relations, e.g., as between 
the United States and Mexico, and Nicaragua and both the United States and Mexico. See 
DAVID A. LAKE, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22–23 (2009). That is, it can 
still be true among particular states that, as Lake puts it, “the right to rule rests on a social 
contract in which the ruler provides a political order of value to the ruled, who in turn grant 
legitimacy to the ruler and comply with the restraints on their behavior necessary for the 
production of that order.” Id. at 3. 
23. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 378–79 (1971) (explaining that principles 
of justice among nations include “the right of a people to settle its own affairs without
the intervention of foreign powers”). 
24. Practices of recognition are arguably central to the territorial order. See Ruggie, 
supra note 17, at 162. 
25. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 8 (1977). 
26. Id.
 27. 	Id. 
The Germanic peoples of the Dark Ages, for example, were independent political
communities, but while their rulers asserted supremacy over a population, they did
not assert it over a distinct territory.  The kingdoms and principalities of Western
Christendom in the Middle Ages were not states: they did not possess internal 
sovereignty because they were not supreme over authorities within their territory
and population; and at the same time they did not possess external sovereignty
since they were not independent of the Pope or, in some cases, the Holy Roman 
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But is the state system really a social practice, as opposed, say, to a
mere system of coordination?  It is in the following minimal sense: the 
conduct of different agents is more or less effectively coordinated by 
widely understood social expectations, as rationalized and adjusted by
some shared, or at least presumed, purposes.  Most people, most collectives, 
and most of their officials the world over assume the basic norms of the 
state system are widely accepted and followed, and most largely comply 
with those norms on the presumption that enough others are doing
likewise, in what may be collectively self-fulfilling expectations.  Such 
expectations are themselves governed and adjusted over time, as political 
actors rationalize or adjust norms of state conduct, whether through state 
policy, treaties, international administration, political argument, or trend-
setting action—all without a global state.28 
The system can also be said to have purposes if they can merely be 
presumed.  That is, they need not be actually endorsed, widely or even at
all. For, I suggest, mere ideational endorsement can coordinate conduct,
without genuinely shared purposes; as long as enough of the agents accept
that enough of the other agents endorse a purpose, even if few or none of 
them in fact accept its necessity or value, the agents may still more or less 
effectively coordinate around the presumed end.  In that sense, the 
coordinated group presumes the end.29  So, for example, since the founding 
Treaties of Westphalia the aim of peace, or at least of improved security, 
has been generally endorsed in at least the ideational sense, if not also
widely supported. For all its horrors, the system did eventually bring the 
virtual end of territorial conquest, at first in Europe, and finally in the era 
of decolonization, and, in recent decades, has dramatically reduced war
Emperor.  In parts of Africa, Australia and Oceania, before the European intrusion, 
there were independent communities held together by ties of lineage or kinship, 
in which there was no such institution as government.  Entities such as these fall 
outside the purview of “international relations,” if by this we mean. . .the 
relations of states in the strict sense. . . . But where states are in regular contact 
with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between them sufficient
to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the
other, then we may speak of their forming a system. 
Id. at 8–10. 
28. Such governance may well amount to what Krasner calls an “organized hypocrisy,” 
because states routinely violate the norms they say they affirm.  But the ideational affirmation 
that lip service perpetuates means that people worldwide are more or less generally organized,
in a generally governed system, all the same. See KRASNER, supra note 22, at 41–44. 
29. This is consistent with degrees of cooperativeness and perhaps corresponding
degrees of stability in different settings.  How cooperative a group is may depend on such
varying factors as how widely a social purpose is actually endorsed; whether and to what 
degree people personally intend to comply, and for what reasons; whether people are 
motivated by moral concerns; and whether to what degree people have genuinely shared
intentions, joint commitments, or shared identities, etc.
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and violence, in conjunction with any number of factors.  Suitably revised, 
the state system now appears to be at least capable of advancing peace 
over the long haul, much as Kant once dreamed.30  Unlike the practice of 
slavery, the state system is not so patently unjustifiable that it should be 
abolished rather than further improved.  We can tentatively presume its 
basic moral legitimacy, if only for lack of fundamental options, even if it 
still requires deep revision. 
The state system can also be said to have further aims, especially in its 
post-war understanding.  It arguably aims to secure conditions: (i) for stable 
possession, the establishment of individual or collective property rights, 
and the conservation of resources; (ii) for societal economic development
and plenty; (iii) for collective self-governance and self-determination;
(iv) for the realization of basic civil, political, and economic rights; and 
(v) even, perhaps, for larger social justice—perhaps variously understood. 
To be sure, the aims of peace and security are less controversial than these 
other candidates. They seem most amenable to a Catholic interpretive 
defense that defers to established social understandings, even when they
seem to conflict with our personal moral or interpretive judgment as 
theorists. A relatively protestant interpretation, by comparison, will rely 
more heavily on the interpreter’s own understandings and evaluations in 
making sense of a social structure. While both forms of interpretation can 
be constructive, to different degrees, the latter offers greater latitude for
defending an expansive list of aims or principles—though still in the name 
of interpretive charity, which may still fall short well of our own best, 
freestanding ideas of justice. Even a constructive interpretation is still an
interpretation of a state system that is anyway there, rather than a pure 
moral recommendation about how things ought to be, ideally speaking.31 
So the question remains what societies owe to each other, by virtue of 
their common association.  To answer, one may argue that, absent special 
justification, members of a society can reasonably complain on their society’s 
behalf when the international system creates or permits disadvantages to
their societies as compared to other societies, as regards the state system’s
purposes. Where feasible, advantaged societies are then morally required 
30. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I, 12 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 205, 205–35 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 2, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 323–53 (1983). 
31. Two of my articles address the pros and cons of “Catholic” and “Protestant”
methods of constructive interpretation.  Reply, supra note 3, at 288–89; Practices, supra note 
3, at 47. 
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to adopt policies that can be expected to mitigate the disadvantages over 
time, in order that less advantaged countries be treated fairly under the 
shared practice, as a matter of structural equity. 
So, for instance, it may be argued that the system has the aim of securing 
conditions for societal economic development and plenty and that the state 
system or its elements helps to explain why countries grow rich or remain
poor. In that case, it may be said, developed states will have an associational 
obligation to provide assistance—whether in the form of emergency relief,
security, or development assistance—or, where feasible, diplomatic, economic,
or military intervention.  Societies that suffer the relative disadvantages can
complain of any version of the practice in which better-advantaged
societies fail to reliably provide them with important and necessary forms 
of aid.  Barring special justifications for inaction, the relatively advantaged 
societies would arguably lack a comparably strong complaint against
expectations of intervention, because the sacrifices would be sufficiently
low, especially as shared over a large population. 
Development assistance would thus be a matter of associational obligation, 
even if separate natural or humanitarian duties also apply.  But, likewise,
any interpretively attributed aim of the state system, whether peace,
collective self-determination, economic development, or basic domestic 
social justice, could support demands for fair treatment under the common
practice, along with corresponding obligations for the states in a position 
to effect reform.
This kind of argument is to some degree hostage to empirical fortune; 
it assumes the relevant objectionable consequences—continued poverty— 
can be attributed to the state system itself or one of its versions.  At the 
same time, the system need only have an enabling causal role or general 
contributory tendencies in conjunction with many other causal factors.  It
may be quite enough to point to tendencies of the system’s politically
decentralized and territorial nature, including the following familiar 
examples.32 Abuse: People are largely left in the hands of their sovereign, 
at heightened risk of abuse.  What people gain in being freed from wars 
and invasions, they may lose in domestic tyranny or oppression, persistent
corruption, or complacency in the design of economic policy.  Even in a 
relatively decent regime, they may suffer persistent political exclusion or 
underrepresentation.  Coordination Failure: In general, the policies of
different sovereign governments are difficult to coordinate.  Cross-border 
externalities, from trade or pollution policies, easily appear to be someone 
else’s problem, or devolve into mutual “beggar my neighbor” policies and
 32. See Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy For International Law, 41 PHIL. &  
PUB. AFF. 2, 17–19 (2013), for this orientation to the problem, albeit as a question of law, 
and several of the following examples. 
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recriminations.  Even in dealing with the most urgent commons problems— 
the spread of serious disease, regional pollution, or global problems such
as climate change—separate sovereigns do not readily rise to collective 
state action, often at great loss to their respective populations. Perverse
Incentives: Established international privileges give illegitimate rulers 
title for the legal sale of a country’s resources and the right to borrow in 
its name, which can in turn create incentives for corruption and persistent 
underdevelopment.33 Exclusion: The mere existence of enforced borders 
excludes individuals and societies from natural and social resources,
including bare means of physical subsistence, when a home society is not 
adequately providing them. The adverse consequences of exclusion may 
not be readily compensated for by the general benefits of dividing the 
world into territorial states.  Many willing migrants will be excluded from 
greener pastures, and whole societies may suffer unfavorable conditions 
for development—because of a worsening climate, because poor geography 
has left them far from trade routes, or because they have inherited poorly 
governed institutions, in part due to perverse incentives created by
the international system.  As the case of Kiribati suggest, low-lying island
nations may find themselves shopping for a home, with no unclaimed
territory on the planet readily available for ready settlement.
In each of these cases, the state system may be said to generate its own 
practice-dependent demands of justice—to accept immigrants, to aid
developing countries, to offer cooperation in trade.  This can be true aside 
from any further practice-independent moral requirements, in a way that
is addressed to the practice itself.  The animating objections make 
reference to one or more of the state system’s systemic tendencies.  They 
lay claim to an alternative institutional design in the name of the societal
goods promised by the system, in the very aims that define the common
enterprise. In that case, in contrast to mere appeals to welfare or humanity, 
the objection has a distinctive kind of internal force.  The objection cannot 
be reasonably treated as irrelevant in the decisions at issue if the societal
goods in question define the association’s very point.  In addition, when 
societies within the system are asked to bear costs of reform in the 
33. See  THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4–6 (2002); Leif
Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 9 (2008) (“The
blessing of resources turns into a curse when tyrants and insurgents are allowed to sell off
a country’s resources . . . and to use the proceeds in ways that make the people worse off.”).
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system’s own name, they are merely expected to sacrifice so that other 
societies might enjoy the system’s promised benefits as well.
When principles are justified as the system’s own internal principles,
all state participants may be said to have standing to demand fulfillment
of what they require, a general status that non-members of the system would
not enjoy.  A state’s ability to exercise this standingto get a hearing and 
movement toward reformmay or may not be very effective.  Among other
factors, beyond a government’s bargaining power, much may depend
on how far the principles invoked are in fact socially recognized, even if only 
in the thin, ideational sense.  But associational principles of the system would
seem to be especially apt to induce the requisite social perceptions, and 
perhaps, eventually, meaningful change. 
A given international associative obligation, though perhaps of great 
significance for economic policy by itself, will also have limits.  It will 
apply only to the systemic tendency for which it is justified, unless a more 
encompassing rationale is provided.  More generally, any such associative 
principles and obligations will be international in nature.  Their concern 
in the first instance will be societal economic prospects—or a given
member’s complaint on behalf of his or her society’s prospects.  They will 
be addressed directly to a society’s rulers and only indirectly to the citizenry
charged with holding its rulers accountable for the society’s obligations. 
Accordingly, international associative principles may not provide a general 
egalitarian basis for comparing the plights of any two individuals of the 
world, in view of their respective shares of the world’s total personal or
societal resources.
IV. GLOBAL JUSTICE 
The third question I posed at the outset asks how significant such
associational demands might be in matters of socioeconomic distributive 
justice. Although any given requirement may be limited on its own in the 
ways suggested, my larger claim is that that, taken all together, practice-
generated principles and obligations are enormously consequential for 
how wealth is to be distributed around the world. In particular, provided
domestic inequality is appropriately regulated according to domestic 
practice-based principles of distribution, we have a complex principled 
basis for an international system that can be expected to yield roughly
equalized standards of living globally.  In short, if harmonizing living 
standards is the economist’s dream for the mythical long run, practice-
based justice demands an international system that, as far as possible, makes 
the dream a reality sooner rather than later—within the current century. 
That is, international associative obligations arguably require the 
international system to eventually bring all societies up to advanced—and 
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perhaps increasing—world standards of living.  For, it may be argued, 
given the state system’s aim of fostering conditions for development and 
societal plenty, and insofar as its institutional realization helps to causally 
explain persistent relative depravation, in part through territorial exclusion
and other problematic tendencies, relatively advantaged societies will be
required to facilitate the comparable socioeconomic development of
relatively disadvantaged societies through aid, lending, and trade.  Therefore, 
if we first imagine universal autarky, societies would at least have 
associative obligations to open borders for immigration and provide some
aid. To the extent, those measures are limited; they would also have 
to establish an international trade practice when it does not exist already. 
Once established the more egalitarian principles for trade practice would 
kick in. Gains over background endowments would then have to be 
distributed equally among trading countries, unless unequal gains flow to 
poor countries.34  As background endowments change, given “factor price 
equalization,” a fair international system could be expected to bring 
convergence in societal standards of living, much as economic theory
claims. In due course, developing countries catch up, rising well beyond 
any threshold of absolute poverty, reaching parity with advanced world 
living standards. 
This can be expected in part due to dynamic trade to comparative 
advantage, which shapes endowments over time.  Societal capacities of
production can be internalized into trade practice relatively quickly, and 
that process may be accelerated as societies fulfill their separate 
background associational obligations, which either enable integration or
distribute its fruit. If we idealize, imagining good will among countries, 
we can form certain normative expectations about what would come to
pass in a world in which societies were steadily fulfilling their various 
associative obligations in trade, financial regulation, and developmental
assistance.  With relatively modest economic assumptions, we could 
normatively expect developing countries to catch up relatively rapidly. 
And when we return to our world, where commitment to fairness is at best
shaky and circumstantial, we are still in a position to say that this is what
fairness finally demands, and what world politics must agree to and 
facilitate if each society is to be given its due. 
To be sure, it is a matter of considerable empirical uncertainty what it
would take, over what span of time, to bring about the rough equalization
 34. See FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 203–05. 
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of living standards worldwide.  But the issue is not simply one of economic
conjecture.  The possibilities of convergence depend heavily on international 
policy coordination—on domestic tax policy and international cooperation 
on tax competition—of a kind, that turns as much on political will as 
economic fundamentals.  In the present picture, rough equality is what we 
can expect of a fair international order; it is what must happen, as quickly
as possible, if societies are to associate on equitable terms in international 
relationships of the sort we have already. 
We thus have a rationale for expecting rough global material equality, 
but from specifically international principles, along with economic
assumptions about tendencies of “factor price equalization”.  We reach a 
strong distributional result with no assumption any single, cosmopolitan 
principle of distribution applies among all the individuals of the world— 
by a globalization of Rawls’s domestic difference principle.35  We still
only compare the relative plights of whole societies, and of individuals 
within societies, without comparing how any two individuals fare anywhere 
in the world.  This shows that the state system and practice of trade, by 
themselves, still would not necessarily ground more robust cosmopolitan 
principles. A case for them can still of course be argued, though it would
have to be explained whether and how the grounds invoked really are 
associative in nature.36 
V. THE AIMS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
So far, the grand promises I have offered are no more than promises,
and indeed something of a précis for a book in progress, which will offer 
a full elaboration and defense. My hope in all this is to cover the properly 
central areas of political philosophy’s concern in practice-based terms, so
to invite a larger question: is this not what a political philosophy of global
justice is, or at least should be all about? 
To answer “yes” to this question is to assume a conception of the aims 
of a political philosophy of global justice.  In the remainder of my discussion, 
I develop one such conception, which includes two theses:
Centrality: The proper aspiration of a political philosophy of global
justice is to account for the central range of issues facing world politics. 
Sufficiency: There is indeed an acceptable practice-based account, albeit 
complex and pluralistic, that suffices to cover this central range of issues.
 35. See  RAWLS, supra note 23, at 302 (explaining that the difference principle, 
Rawls’ second principle of justice, requires that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities [] be
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . . and (b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”). 
36. For elaboration of this point, see Fortune and Fairness in Global Economic Life, 
supra note 14 (manuscript at 34–36). 
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The issues that such an account does not or cannot plausibly address are
properly regarded as peripheral or secondary issues. 
The Centrality claim does not say whether any approach to justice 
suffices to cover the central issues—it could be that none does.  Provided 
a conception of what issues are properly central rather than peripheral, one
could deny the claim to Sufficiency, to argue that, the political philosophy of
global justice is doomed for failure.  Perhaps the best approaches to
justice—practice-based and otherwise—at best justify peripheral concerns, 
leaving the enterprise a failure on its own terms.
To advance the Sufficiency claim is to resist this kind of skepticism
about political philosophy’s enterprise.  In that case, along with the 
Centrality claim, capturing the central range of issues facing world politics
does indeed fulfill its proper and high aspirations. As one may elaborate, 
we thus see political philosophy as not only part of human culture and 
politics, but as making a distinctive contribution—reason’s contribution— 
without which, it may be added, humanity is lost in cynicism, despair, and
perhaps the unraveling of much that is good in our social existence.  In
politics, the still small voice of reason is all too often unheard or ignored.  
Yet through studied exercise of reason itself and in view of the highest 
standards of thought, philosophers can and must try to speak and be heard
on reason’s behalf.37 
The Sufficiency claim says only that some sort of practice-based 
account is sufficient, which leaves room to argue over versions.  Like non-
relational luck-egalitarian views, some associational cosmopolitanisms 
claim to capture global socioeconomic justice in one fell swoop; the 
relationships now found among more or less all people suffice for
egalitarian principles that apply among all individuals.38  My own practice 
theory takes an internationalist approach.  A plural set of international
associational obligations, for societies rather than persons as such, covers 
the central issues, or at least will once fully elaborated.  I trade simplicity 
for complexity, in hopes of a better articulated, more illuminating, and 
37. The selectorate theory of politics suggests that officials concerned with “political
survival” are not listening to reason, in a way that invites cynical challenge to the point of
speaking up with normative arguments.  I answer this challenge in a forthcoming paper. 
Aaron James, How Cynical Can Ideal Theory Be?, INT’L J. POL. THEORY 1–3 (forthcoming
2016).
 38. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1979); KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONS, AND LUCK (2012). 
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normatively forceful approach, which I address in more detail below.39 
The complexity saddles us with difficult interpretive questions about our 
world-historical moment and basic social practices, which may be many
and various, and, a priori, may or may not add up to any properly global 
theory of justice, as opposed to a mixed bag of local accounts, which lack
global scope. Nevertheless, as sketched earlier, the project is to show that
we can indeed construct an internationalist conception of global 
socioeconomic justice, not in one fell swoop, but in roughly two steps. 
VI. CENTRALITY 
If the Centrality claim is correct, many recent debates have been of 
limited significance.  The question of global or international justice has 
often been assumed to turn on the question of how to define the concept 
of socioeconomic distributive justice, where its scope is limited by some 
stated general necessary condition for the concept’s very applicability in
global affairs.  What is the essential mark?  Coercion?  Sovereign authority? 
Pervasive influence? Reciprocal cooperation? Undeserved misfortune? 
The scope and limits of one’s favored conditions is then assumed to
circumscribe what socioeconomic justice might require and so thus confine
its application—within societies, or some relational context, etc.40 
This has a certain theoretical utility, beyond giving professional 
theorists something to argue about.  We thus test the scope and limits of 
various specific rationales for speaking of justice, social justice, or 
socioeconomic distributive justice.  Yet the exercise by itself can be seen
as a largely verbal issue; it may mean only that we should distinguish 
different issues, species of justice, or justice concepts.  We can thus grant 
a proposed restriction on a moral concept at issue, but simply add that it 
is but one moral concept among many, and that other moral concepts are 
not so restricted.  Given the Centrality thesis, what is finally at stake is not
such questions of definition and scope of application in view of necessary
conditions for a given justice concept.  What is at stake is what kinds of
values, duties, or obligations are sufficient to capture, at least on some 
plausible elaboration of what issues are of properly central importance, 
the central moral issues facing world politics—issues of legitimacy,
 39. See infra Part VIII. 
40. For such debates, see, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A  
GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 1 (2005); Arash Abizadeh, Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, 
and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice, 35 PHIL. &  PUB. AFF. 318, 
320 (2007); Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 257, 257–58 (2001); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 113, 114 (2005); Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the 
State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3–4 (2007). 
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sovereignty, human rights, economic development, climate change, and 
socioeconomic distribution, et cetera. 
Accordingly, one can be ecumenical about justice concepts.  Even as an 
international practice theorist, I grant that a non-relational luck egalitarianism 
is true for natural or cosmic fairness or justice.  Yet I maintain that the 
latter concepts are peripheral rather than central issues for global economic 
politics. The case for this must of course be made.41  But the case against 
it would also have to be made, and until the issue of relevance is
adequately addressed, we have taken only the first clarifying steps in the
direction of political philosophy’s proper, more ambitious objectives. 
This is not to deny the relevance of definition, but rather to clarify its 
potential significance. Following Rawls, the thought can be that concepts 
are to be paired with appropriate conceptions, in the form of principles for 
a given concept’s application.42  But here the adjustment is a two-way street.  
On the one hand, we assign conceptions to different concepts, refining
principles in view of the concept at issue.  Yet, on the other hand, we also 
refine our ideas of the different concepts there are by our independent 
sense of what differences we find in the conceptions or principles they 
support. When principles differ, but seem best placed under different
concepts, we have no need to choose between them as apt forms of moral
evaluation, under their appropriate conditions.  Each conception can be 
basic relative to its corresponding concept, with no further conceptual 
question of which concept is more or less basic.  But for all such conceptual 
excavation says, the relevance of any given concept still must be separately 
established. For some concepts may be central, while others are at best of 
peripheral importance. 
Here, political philosophy can be mainly about the systematic development 
of different theories. However, the aim of this is to say what justice 
concept, conception, and methodology for its application, if any, would or
would not suffice to cover the relevant, central bases.  Much will depend 
on what issues are properly central rather than peripheral, but the thesis of 
Centrality would at least set political philosophy’s target.  The grand
theory that does suffice is the one that makes good on the political 
philosophy’s high aspiration to make a signal contribution to human
 41. See, e.g., Fortune and Fairness in Global Economic Life, supra note 14 (manuscript 
at 8). 
42. RAWLS, supra note 23, at 9.
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culture and politics, which philosophers and larger humanity could really
be proud of—and ask to be lavishly funded, without embarrassment.
As suggested earlier, success in this is by no means assured.  Perhaps, 
among the properly central issues, which have rightly risen to prominence 
in the public’s imagination, philosophy is not fit to help us understand or
justify them.  In that case, we should remove any confidence about the
authority of philosophy, withholding our bets and hopes on its particular 
methods of reason.  We could settle for a more modest, do-able task of 
mere conceptual analysis but we would be settling for a larger failure.  The 
practice-based approach, in resisting this conclusion, hopes not only to 
make philosophy’s contribution to global politics, but also to help bolster 
the authority of philosophy itself. 
VII. NORMATIVITY 
So much is by way of explicating the thesis of Centrality, if it is correct. 
How might it be motivated in the first place?  I suggest that a political 
philosophy of domestic or global justice covers the properly central range 
of issues if, and only if, it covers all of the basic normative questions of 
justice about what we ought to do in political and social affairs, in a certain 
strong sense. 
What sense? Suppose for the sake of argument that one properly central 
aim of political philosophy is to intervene in political argument in a given 
era of world history.  A central task of the human enterprise of political
philosophy—not its only task, but an essential task of central importance— 
is to say what we now ought to do, as a principled matter of what justice,
or fairness, requires of us. Justice, or fairness, would then be “normative 
for us” in at least that way; its principles would say what specified real-
world political agents normally have sufficient reason to do, absent
extenuating circumstances, despite a range of competing considerations
and the inevitable risks and uncertainties of collective or personal action. 
Further, in arguing about such things philosophically, we must go beyond 
justifying conclusive demands of fairness, simply by our own lights as 
theorists. The task of justifying normative demands, in the relevant strong 
sense, would be to justify them in a way that makes them plain to those to 
whom the demands are addressed—in a way that could be hoped or even 
expected, with luck and favorable circumstances, to shape real world 
social cooperation. 
I take this to be a—and perhaps the—central ambition of Rawls’s
domestic theory of justice, especially in A Theory of Justice.43  The point
of the original position is to make the basic demands of justice evident to 
43. Id. 
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those who would otherwise not appreciate them, so to enable ongoing 
cooperation.44  It is to so fashion a publicly recognized basis for mutual 
justification from what people share in common, in order to make things 
plain to people, in a way that could encourage and sustain good faith
cooperation, in a kind of “moral geometry.”45 
Whether or not Rawls’s effort was successful, notice that it will not 
suffice to say only that we have some reason to advance an ideal offered
to us, as practicality permits—if it ever permits.46  If the proposed reason 
is normally insufficient to outweigh competing values, it will not count as 
“normative for us,” in the intended strong sense.  For all an appeal to a 
mere ideal says, no principles of justice ever give rise to any normally
sufficient reasons for action, despite a range of competing values.47 
Justice is “fine for a perfect world,” as conservatives sometimes put it, but 
not applicable in our world, and so not necessary for us. 
Now let us also assume, again for the sake of argument, that political
philosophy can rightly have other aims as well.  Perhaps we simply wish 
to explain our own convictions about justice to ourselves, without regard
to practicality except insofar as that, too, reflects pure conviction.48  And 
should not a thousand flowers bloom in political philosophy’s garden? A 
world-historical theorist engaged in normative political philosophy can
certainly welcome any clarification on offer, however removed it may be 
from real practice.  The practice theorist need only insist that this will not 
serve all of political philosophy’s central purposes. 
Yet even such ecumenism will have a crucial condition: if the 
clarification largely neglects the strongly normative demands of justice, it
will not help political philosophy rise to its most important occasion.  As 
interesting as clarification may otherwise be, without the practice-based 
argument, the enterprise of political philosophy might sill fail to speak for 
44. See id. 
45. I develop this aspiration to “moral geometry,” seen as akin to mathematical 
demonstration, in Aaron James Political Constructivism, in A COMPANION TO RAWLS 251, 
253 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014) [hereinafter Political Constructivism].
Note that Hobbes had much the same ambition for Leviathan. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
viii-ix (Richard Tuck ed., 1991). 
46. G. A. Cohen said just this about his luck egalitarianism in some moments, by
allowing that greater welfare may often outweigh equality (personal communication). 
47.  Here, it is often said that we are simply to “promote” a value, while bracketing 
the relative force of different competing values.  I regard this as something of a fudge, or 
at least a placeholder for further views of the kind I am considering. 
48. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 3. 
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VIII. SUFFICIENCY 
My grand claim, then, is that a practice-sensitive argument can indeed 
underwrite political philosophy’s enterprise.  It suffices to capture the 
properly central range of issues in world politics by justifying an appropriate
set of normative demands for real practice in our current world-historical 
station. 
Specifically, a practice-based method offers a way of proposing principles
that are recognizable as normally conclusive requirements for action, 
rather than mere worthy and perhaps readily overridden values, on a basis 
that is available to the agents being addressed.  We can credibly address a 
practice underway, given its understood structure and purposes, with
participants that have some understandings of its workings, or at least the 
basis for gaining a deeper understanding beyond what may be their superficial 
awareness of its elements.  In that case, we can say that our attempt to 
speak for reason might be heard, because the practitioners are in a position
to grasp and admit demands of fairness that arise and apply to them by 
virtue of the relationship they are already in.  If they have understood the 
argument, they will not be in a position to slough off a particular demand
as a mere worthy ideal, which is not applicable to them, or as “fine for an 
ideal world” but otherwise “impractical” or “too utopian.”  If all goes well,
we will have given them an argument that the principles are indeed
normative for them, by making it plain on their own terms.  They not only 
in fact have certain normally conclusive reasons for action; they can see 
this for themselves, in part by way of understanding themselves.49 
Earlier I sketched a two-step practice account of worldwide socioeconomic 
distribution.50 I take that to be a central issue, but many other issues are
presumably central as well.  So the final success of practice-based 
approach depends on how far practice accounts might apply in these other
issue areas. Practice approaches are being developed on a range of topics,
49. This can be true quite aside from the individual agent’s particular aims or
loyalties.  Christine Korsgaard, reads Kant as developing a similar but more general
approach for “categorical” demands as against the moral skeptic, based on a person’s own 
rational self-understanding.  CHRISTINE KORSGAARD ET AL., THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 
(Onora O’Neill ed., 1996). One might add that people in a social practice are appropriately
subject to criticism and held accountable to a degree they might not be for principles that 
are not normative form them in some such strong sense.  I have discussed Rawls’s appeal
to the Kantian idea of “autonomy” in other works.  See Political Constructivism, supra
note 45, at 253; Aaron James, Constructivism, Intuitionism, Ecumenism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, (Serena Olsaretti ed.) (forthcoming). 
50. See supra Part V.
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including human rights,51 legitimacy, and international law.52  My claim is 
that the practice-based project can successfully account for the issue of 
socioeconomic distributive justice within and across societies as well.  So 
although my account of fairness in international trade practice is by itself
insufficient to capture all of the central issues facing world politics, the
more general practice approach can credibly promise to do so.  There is at
least reason for confidence that we can round out the picture, and so help
political philosophy rise to its world-historical cultural and political 
occasion.53
 51. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); ALLEN 
BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013). 
52. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 2, 30 (2013); AUTHORITY AND TERRITORY, supra note 15, at 5;  Daniel David
Pilchman, A Practice Theory of International Law (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California Irvine) (on file with author). 
53. I wish to thank the participants of the University of San Diego workshop on 
global justice and trade at which an earlier version of this paper was discussed. 
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